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We study a cobweb-type commodity market characterised by a strictly monotone
demand and supply, in which n ﬁrms operate. The ﬁrms are assumed to diﬀer in a
key parameter governing price expectations which we suppose to be adaptive. We
characterise the unique steady state of the resulting economic dynamics in terms of
stability and we study the impact of the number and diversity of ﬁrms: to this end
we introduce the notions of structural and behavioural degree of instability which
prove to be crucial in determining whether stability or instability prevail. We also
consider the case of market integration and establish conditions to have stability (or
instability) in the aggregated market in terms of the original (structural and behav-
ioural) degrees of instability. We take up the issue of transitional dynamics and speed
of convergence when the system is stable and characterise parametric conﬁgurations
that maximise the speed of convergence. Finally, we assume that the ﬁrms - via
the parameter which deﬁnes their expectations - are sampled independently from a
population described by a given probability distribution. In this case the structural
degree of instability determines how the number of potentially diﬀerent ﬁrms aﬀects
the probability of ending up with a stable outcome.
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The existence of a certain amount of heterogeneity in economic expectations is uncon-
troversial. Evidence of heterogeneous expectations in inﬂation forecasts for example
(both by professionals and non-professional forecasters) has been found in Branch [1],
Carroll [6] and Mankiw et al. [18]. The extent, the variability and the consequences
of such expectations disagreement are an open and interesting research question.
The range of applications and models in which such question receives attention in-
cludes for example monetary policy theory and design (as in Honkapohja and Mitra
[15]), models of exchange rate dynamics (e.g. Manzan and Westerhoﬀ [19]) and as-
set pricing (for recent examples see Buraschi and Jiltsov [4], Jouini and Napp [17]).
Heterogeneous expectations have also been invoked to explain stylized facts such as
the volume of trade exchange (see e.g. Frankel and Froot [12]). Further, for some
types of agricultural markets in which biological lags naturally suggest the use of
cobweb models, heterogeneous expectations have been detected and estimated, for
instance by Chavas [7]. A rather comprehensive survey on this thread of literature
can be found in Hommes [16].
In essence, in this paper we study conditions under which coordination or dis-
agreement of beliefs among individuals of limited rationality emerge and the eventual
impact of a moderate degree of expectations’ heterogeneity on dynamic stability. In
particular we consider the problem of characterizing dynamic stability of equilibria
in a cobweb model in which n ﬁrms use adaptive expectations with ﬁrm-speciﬁcg a i n
parameters. This issue can also be considered a generalization of the problems stud-
ied by Nerlove [21] and Carlson [5] a few decades ago. The heterogeneity we take
into account is indeed moderate because it is limited to a key parameter governing
expectations which are otherwise all drawn from the same expectations mechanism.
It turns out that in our model two sources of (potential) instability can be identi-
ﬁed: a structural source, linked to the market’s fundamentals (such as the shape of
demand and supply curves) and a behavioural source, embedded in the average pro-
ﬁle of expectations. A necessary and suﬃcient condition for local stability involving
these factors is demonstrated. Such condition implies no particular restriction on
individual ﬁrms, but only on the entire set of ﬁr m sa saw h o l e .T h es t r u c t u r a la n d
behavioural sources of instability also show up as we study the eﬀects of changing the
number of market’s participants and the various possible outcomes of market integra-
tion. For the asymptotically stable conﬁgurations, we study the speed of convergence
and we characterize the situations in which convergence occurs monotonically and
those in which the steady state is approached through oscillations giving rise to
the traditional cobweb phenomena. Besides, we explain the factors determining the
fastest approach towards the steady state.
Motivated by the diﬃculty to actually observe expectations, whereas it is easier
to measure some structural features of a given market, such as the relevant demand
and supply price elasticities, we take the perspective of an observer (e.g. a policy
maker) whose information set includes the structural but not the behavioural degree
of instability. We therefore consider a setup in which the ﬁr m si n v o l v e di nt h em a r k e t
are sampled independently from a continuous distribution of such ﬁrms. In practice,
because what deﬁnes each ﬁrm is their behavioural parameter, we devise a simple
1model of random selection of such parameters from a given distribution. We provide
probabilities of convergence when only the structural source of instability is known
exactly. A form of polarization of convergence probabilities induced by increasing
the number of market’s participants is documented. When the number of ﬁrms gets
large, stability is almost certain for levels of the structural degree of instability up to
a certain threshold, while the system is almost certainly unstable past the threshold.
The present work is related to a number of papers, some of which include a
similar underlying structure based on a cobweb economy with heterogeneous beliefs
of some kind, such as Brock and Hommes [3] (whose basic setup we largely borrow),
Chiarella et al. [8], Branch and Evans [2]: our paper is diﬀerent because it does not
address endogenous heterogeneity as in the Brock and Hommes tradition nor do we
have proper learning as in the literature described in (and stimulated by) the well
known book by Evans and Honkapohja [9]. Our perspective is a slightly diﬀerent,
as it prompts us to understand what is to be expected when changes in the number
of (diﬀerent) ﬁrms acting on a market are produced, for instance as the result of
market integration or merging into a common, bigger marketplace, considering all
other details as given.
Negroni [20] investigates a two-agents problem with adaptive expectations which
is akin to ours but for the assumed asymmetry in the roles of the agents which we
do not have here. A closely related feature also shows up in the paper by Evans
and Guesnerie [10], who name it "structural heterogeneity" and show its potential
role of destabilising force when coupled with diﬀerent beliefs. The kind of spirit
animating the present work, namely that of studying the outcomes due to changes in
the number of diﬀerent agents in a dynamic model (or the overall agents’ diversity)
is shared by Herrendorf et al. [14] and, more recently, by Puu [22].
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the model and states a
couple of results which are then used throughout the paper. The issue of understand-
ing the speciﬁcr o l eo ft h en u m b e ro fﬁrms in shaping stability is addressed in Section
3. Speed of convergence and the dynamics in the transition to the steady state are
analysed in Section 4. Section 5 deals with the probability of convergence when the
ﬁrms’ behavioural characteristics are sampled from a given probability distribution.
All the proofs are contained in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a cobweb-type commodity market in which each of n ﬁrms needs to allow
for a production lag and so choose optimal supplied quantities conditioned on the
forecasted future price pe








i) depends on the available technology. Demand is a function of the current
price D(p). We assume a strictly increasing supply and a strictly decreasing demand,
which are smooth and intersecting at a point p∗.B y d e ﬁning Ψ =
P
i ψi as the
aggregate production scale factor, S (·)=Ψs(·) and φi =
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Up to this point, the model is rather standard: it diﬀers for example from Brock
and Hommes [3] only in the fact that ﬁrms dimensions, ψi, are kept separated from
market shares, φi. While this is costless in terms of the required algebra - we only
need to add the constant Ψ to an otherwise standard model - it will help us in a
later discussion about the eﬀects of market size variations on the stability properties
of equilibria.
In a diﬀerent but equally common formulation of this model, aggregation uses a
weighted average of expectations as the argument of the actual law of motion (see
Branch and Evans [2]): we compare results obtained under such diﬀerent modelling
strategy in Section 2.3.
We close the model assuming that expectations are adaptive with gains that
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The above assumptions on the monotonicity of supply and demand guarantee that
there will be a unique steady state for the system (2), corresponding to the supply-
demand equilibrium price p∗. Notice that, in spite of the simplicity of adaptive
expectations, the number of diﬀerent ﬁrms determines the dimension of the dynam-
ical system (2): this is a distinguishing feature of the model. Assuming for example
that the n ﬁrms use AR(p) forecasting models (with lags up to a given p)w o u l dm a k e
the dimension of the system independent of n:s oal a r g en u m b e ro fﬁrms would not,
as it does here, complicate the tractability of the model.
2.1 Special case: one representative ﬁrm
It is useful to see what happens if there is only one ﬁrm. In this case the price
equation (1) reduces to pt = D−1 (Ψs(pe
t)) = D−1 (S (pe















and the stability condition is −1 < 1 − α + α
S0(p∗)
D0(p∗) < 1 which, deﬁning δ = −
S0(p∗)
D0(p∗),
we can write as −1 < 1 − α − αδ < 1.U s i n g t h e d e ﬁnition β = α
2−α and the fact
δ>0, stability requires that
δβ < 1 (3)
3As it turns out, the two parameters1 δ,β play a key role throughout the paper.
We label δ the structural degree of instability.N o t i c et h a ta sδ approaches 1 condition
(3) is automatically satisﬁed for any choice of α ∈ (0,1),a n di fδ ≤ 1 stability is
always warranted under adaptive expectations. Therefore we assume δ>1.T h e
parameter β will be called the behavioural degree of instability.
2.2 General case: n ﬁrms
We now turn to the issue of how stability for the model in its general form with
n ﬁrms relates to (behavioural) characteristics of the individual ﬁrms and to the
market’s exogenous structure (as given by the demand and supply functions). To
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It seems fairly intuitive that aggregation should preserve stability if the conditions
for individual stability derived above in (3) are met for each ﬁrm. Indeed this needs
not be the case in general, as Franke and Nesemann [11] have shown in a speciﬁc
case in which two "unstable" learning rules oﬀset each other bringing about a stable
outcome. In our context, given the limited degree of freedom in ﬁrms behaviour,
such phenomenon is not possible and stability (or instability) at the individual level
suﬃce for stability (instability) with many ﬁrms. An intuition of this can be given
as follows: suppose n ﬁrms for which individual stability conditions (3) are met,
are aggregated. Let λ be a real eigenvalue2 of Jn, with an associated eigenvector
v =( v1,...,v n)
T. Then, either
Pn
j=1 φjvj =0or we can assume, without loss of
generality,
Pn
j=1 φjvj =1 .I nt h eﬁrst case, letting vi 6=0 ,w eh a v eλvi =( 1− αi)vi,
so λ =1− αi ∈ (0,1). Otherwise, there is i such that vi ≥
Pn
j=1 φjvj =1so
λvi =( 1− αi)vi − αiδ
n X
j=1
φjvj =⇒ λ =1− αi − αiδ
1
vi
and therefore, using vi ≥ 1 and the assumption that conditions for individual stabil-
ity, −1 < 1−αi−αiδ<1,a r em e tf o re v e r yi, we can conclude that the n-dimensional
system is stable.
1Notice that in turn δ depends on a third parameter, namely Ψ, the overall dimension of the
economy. This is relevant only when market integration is discussed.
2The Jacobian matrix Jn has real eigenvalues only, as we show in Lemma 1.
4I tc a na l s ob es h o w n ,w i t hal i t t l em o r ee ﬀort, that if individual instability holds
for each ﬁrm then instability follows. Notice further that the market can be stable
even though stability is not the case for all individual ﬁrms: consider, for example,
the case of a market with two ﬁrms of equal size having δ =2 , β1 = 1
4 and β2 = 2
3.A s
δβ1 < 1 <δ β 2, condition (3) entails that, in isolation, the ﬁrst ﬁrm implies stability
whereas the second implies instability, but the aggregated market is stable3.S o i t
is interesting to establish conditions by which stability is produced when two (not
both necessarily stable) markets are merged. A more general result encompassing
these cases is the focus of this Section.
We shall require the following preliminary result.
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ii) M has real eigenvalues
iii) (n − 1) eigenvalues of M belong to the interval [mini {bi},maxi {bi}] and for the
smallest eigenvalue of M, λmin,i ti sλmin < mini {bi}
iv) λmin is greater than −1 if and only if the characteristic polynomial, P (λ),i s
positive at λ = −1.
Notice that the Jacobian (4) is a particular speciﬁcation of matrix (5) with ai =
−αi,b i =1−αi,c i = φiδ. Therefore, as a consequence of part ii) and iii) of the above
Lemma applied to (4), the steady state of system (2) can loose (acquire) stability
only through a Period-doubling bifurcation. When the eigenvalues of (4) are all non-
negative the local convergence of expectations, quantities and price to their steady
state value is monotone: in that case, a perturbation of the model’s parameters does
not result in a qualitative change of the dynamics around the steady state. Section
4 returns to this topic at some length.
Let us now turn to the stability properties of the steady state of the market
dynamics.
We deﬁne the market degree of behavioural instability for the n heterogeneous






2−αi. Perhaps surprisingly, stability can be
characterised in terms of ¯ βn and δ in the same way as in the homogeneous case.
Proposition 2 The steady state of the system (2) is locally stable and hyperbolic
(i.e. with eigenvalues strictly inside the unit circle) if and only if δ¯ βn < 1.
The result says that, in order to have stability, the multiplicative combination
of structural and behavioural instability must not exceed one. So this establishes a
threshold for the aggregate sources of instability in the market, marking the frontier
between the stable and the unstable regimes.
3Direct calculation or Proposition 2 below show that such is the case.
52.3 Heterogenous versus Average Representative Agent’s mar-
kets
At this point the reader might raise the following doubt: if the heterogeneity in the
market were incorporated within a single representative ﬁr m ,w o u l dt h e r eb ea n yr e a l
loss with respect to our more complex model? It turns out that the answer is "yes".
We indeed compare the conditions for stability in the homogeneous market with a
single ﬁrm (that we call average representative ﬁrm) which is representative in the
sense that its adaptive gain parameter is equal to the weighted average of parameters
of n given ﬁrms, to those for the heterogeneous market with those n ﬁrms actually
playing directly.
Proposition 3 Consider a market with n ﬁrms deﬁned by gains α1,...,α n and
weights φ1,...,φ n and a market with an average single ﬁrm with gain α =
Pn
i=1 φiαi.
Conditions for stability in the heterogeneous market are suﬃcient but not necessary
for the average homogeneous market.
The following numerical example shows that indeed one can have a stable average
representative ﬁrm such that if each ﬁrm reproduced by the average were to act
directly the outcome would be unstable. Consider n =2 , φ1,2 =1 /2 and δ =2 . If













































Proposition 3 argues in favour of the idea that heterogeneity matters, from the
dynamic stability/instability viewpoint, in that it cannot be safely sterilized by using
an average representation instead of the whole heterogeneous picture. In a sense this
result also appears to indicate that, as opposed to the average representative ﬁrm,
heterogeneity implies (or has a potential for) destabilization. More in general, while
it is crucial to ﬁx ideas precisely as to what (de)stabilizing heterogeneity means, much
depends on the level of structural degree of instability, δ:S e c t i o n5i ss p e c i ﬁcally
devoted to this issue.
3 Some comparative statics and market integra-
tion
This section deals with the general issue of assessing the eﬀect of changes in the
number of ﬁrms (and hence of the amount of behavioural heterogeneity) on stability,
ﬁrst in the context of a comparative statics exercise then as a by-product of a process
of market integration (whereby two separate markets are merged).
To begin with, suppose there is a change in the number of ﬁrms, n,w h i l et h e
aggregate supply and the equilibrium price are unchanged. This is a kind of thought
experiment in which two economies, A and B, have the same aggregate demand
6and supply schedules, the only diﬀerence being in the number of ﬁrms behind the
aggregation on the supply side. The purpose is to isolate the eﬀect of changing the
assortment of diﬀerent beliefs held by the ﬁrms. It is indeed a thought experiment
in the sense that it is diﬃcult to imagine real situations in which a change in n
leaves the aggregate supply and therefore the equilibrium price unchanged. A more
realistic situation arises for example with market integration and we shall move to
this problem later in the section.
We assume that economy A is populated by a given set of ﬁrms whereas in
economy B an extra group of ﬁrms, J, join in the supply side. Because the aggregate
supply has to remain the same we shall make the following assumptions: i) the
overall weight of the entering ﬁrms is 1 − ρ compared to that of the original ﬁrms
which is ρ; ii) the relative dimension of each ﬁrm in economy B, ¯ φi, is obtained by
rescaling its original dimension, φi, with the appropriate overall weight (ρ or 1−ρ).
Letting ¯ βA, ¯ βJ and ¯ βB the aggregate degree of behavioural instability in economy



















= ρ¯ βA +( 1− ρ) ¯ βJ
In light of the above assumptions, the degree of structural instability, δ,i st h es a m e
in both economies.
The following result is now easy to prove. Due to Proposition 2 stability (or
instability) in economy B depends on whether δ¯ βB is smaller (or larger) than 1.
Trivially δ¯ βB = δ
¡
ρ¯ βA +( 1− ρ) ¯ βJ
¢
≶ 1 when δ¯ βA,δ¯ βJ ≶ 1; therefore if economy A
is stable so is economy B if δ¯ βJ < 1.I fi n s t e a dδ¯ βJ > 1 then economy B is stable if
and only if ρ>
δ¯ βJ−1
δ¯ βJ−δ¯ βA. The same goes for instability. So, in this exercise, stability
(or instability) persists when a larger span of jointly stable (or unstable) ﬁrms is
allowed for.
Also, when the ﬁrms in group J would by themselves imply instability, the out-
come depends crucially on their relative weight 1−ρ: such weight needs to be under
(above) a threshold which is a function of the structural and behavioural instability,
δ,¯ βA and ¯ βJ, in order for the outcome to be stable (unstable). Again this is a rather
intuitive result. We can also derive a measure of (in)stability robustness to entry for
a given market. In other words we can answer the following question: what is the
minimum relative weight of joining ﬁrms that can destabilise the market? Intuitively,
the worst that can happen is the entry of a group of ﬁrms of weight 1 − ρ having
a behavioural degree of instability of 1 (i.e. with αi =1for all i). In that case
ρ<
1−δ¯ βA
δ−δ¯ βA would make the system unstable. Remark that this argument relies on
t h ei d e at h a tc h o o s i n gαi =1for all entrant ﬁrms is the "worst that can happen".
This is indeed the case because the largest eigenvalue is always smaller than 1 while
the smallest one is strictly decreasing in αi as we show in the following Lemma.
Lemma 4 If λmax and λmin are the largest and smallest eigenvalues of the Jacobian
(4), then λmin strictly decreases with αi, for all i,w h i l eλmax weakly decreases with
αi, for all i and λmax ≤ 1 − αmin.
7Finally we can also determine a kind of "central value" for the degree of structural
instability, δ. To do so, we compute the stability threshold ratio of ﬁrms in the polar
case of ¯ βA =0and ¯ βJ =1 : it is easy to see that in this case it equals 1/δ, therefore
when δ =2there is a threshold of 50% separating the stable and the unstable regimes
when ﬁrms are only either static or myopic (i.e. when the gain αi is either 0 or 1).
Remarkably, the value of δ =2can be described as a central value also for other
reasons, as we show in Section 5.
To make these points more persuasive, though, it is worth developing more care-
fully on the issue of market integration.
3.1 Market integration
Suppose two markets that were previously independent are aggregated. Assume
that demand and supply are both strictly monotone in both markets so that the
equilibrium price in the integrated market will be intermediate between the two







B be the market equilibria deﬁned by supply
and demand. The aggregated market will have
¡¯ β,δ,p∗,Ψ
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¯ βB,a n dp∗
A <p ∗ <p ∗
B. In general allowing for diﬀerent demand







which does not trivially compare with δA and δB. However, assuming linear demand
functions DA (·) and DB (·) with slopes D
0
A and D0
B and a common linear s(·) with
slope s0 we have δA = −
ΨAs0
D0

























































if ¯ βAδA T 1, ¯ βBδB T 14. Therefore, under such strong assumptions things remain
very similar to our comparative statics scenario above: stability (resp. instability)
of the integrated market immediately follows from stability (resp. instability) of the
original ones. It is nevertheless worth remarking that this needs not be the case if
less is assumed about the demand and the supply functions. Here is an example in
which stability in the original markets is not robust to market integration (see Figure
1):






A =1− ln2 p∗
B =1+l n2 p∗ =1






=2 ¯ βA = ¯ βB = 5
8
4Observe that this reﬂects a well known equality involving arithmetic and harmonic means.




n equals 1. See e.g. Hardy et al. [13], p. 14.
8⇒ δA¯ βA = δB¯ βB =
4
5




Figure 1: Stability for markets considered separately is lost under aggregation.
Analogous examples where unstable markets integrate into a stable larger market
can also be given. One may wonder whether the result in our example is driven by
the change of concavity in the supply. To clarify this point we focus on the case
where demand and supply in the two original markets, A and B, diﬀer only by a
scale factor. So we have
SA (·)=ΨAs(·),D A (·)=ΘAd(·)
SB (·)=ΨBs(·),D B (·)=ΘBd(·)












































δA¯ βB < 1 (7)
then δ¯ β<1 and hence stability carries through to the integrated market.
The above proposition shows some of the possible extra requirements that guar-
antee that stability be robust to market integration. A case in which things are easy
is when d(p)=p−k,s(p)=ph,k,h>0 because δ is a constant equal to h
k.
9Observe that the assumption s0 (p)d00 (p) − s00 (p)d0 (p)
(≤)
≥ 0,w h i c he n s u r e st h a t
the price equilibrium map is monotone, is the same as d00 (p)/d0 (p)
(≥)
≤ s00 (p)/s0 (p)
which in turn means that the elasticity of d0 (p) has to be smaller (larger) than
the elasticity of s0 (p). Further, notice the role played by each market’s speciﬁc
parameters in the technical condition
ΨA/ΘA
ΨB/ΘBδB¯ βA < 1
³
ΨB/ΘB
ΨA/ΘAδA¯ βB < 1
´
,w h i c h
imposes a cross-market constraint on the parameters compatible with persistence of
stability under aggregation.
4 Speed of convergence and cobweb phenomena
When the steady state is locally stable it is interesting to look for more insights
about the path of convergence to the equilibrium. The persistent ﬂuctuating pat-
tern of prices in speciﬁc agricultural markets, originally attracted the attention of
the economics profession in the 1930s and propelled the development of the cobweb
literature. Such ongoing phenomena of recurring price oscillations, which fully re-
tain their interest, prompt us to identify conditions under which our model implies
oscillatory dynamics, in particular along converging paths.
First observe that the model allows both for monotone and for non-monotone
convergence, depending on the parameters values.
Proposition 6 The system (2) shows monotonic local convergence to the steady






Notice that the left hand side of the above inequality tends to 0 with the αi,s o
monotone convergence is always possible independently of the market’s structural
degree of instability level. Furthermore, as the greatest eigenvalue cannot exceed 1,
the robustness of the market stability to parameters perturbations is stronger when
convergence is monotone and also, due to Proposition (4), it increases when the αi
decrease. On the contrary, the speed of convergence5 to the steady state is higher
when convergence is non-monotone as stated in the following Proposition:
Proposition 7 For the system (2), with largest and smallest eigenvalues λmax and
λmin of the Jacobian (4), the speed of convergence to the steady state is maximised
only if λmax = −λmin.
Notice that the above symmetry condition on the largest and smallest eigenvalues
is necessary but it is not suﬃcient.
In order to fully characterise parametric conﬁgurations that maximise the speed
of convergence a few more steps are required. First remark that, if both gain para-
meters and ﬁrms’ weights are variable, then the problem of maximising the speed of
convergence is unbounded. Indeed, to see this consider the following case
φ1 =1 − ε, α1 =
1
1+δ
φ2 = ···= φn =
ε
n − 1
,α 2 = ···= αn =1− ε
5We deﬁne Speed of Convergence to the steady state the quantity σ = −ln(ρ(Jn)),w h e r eρ(Jn)
is the spectral radius of the Jacobian matrix (4).
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for which the speed of convergence is unbounded.
Suppose instead that market shares are equal to 1/n.I nt h i sc a s ew ep r o v et h a t
the conﬁguration of gain parameters that maximises the speed of convergence is
homogeneous.
Proposition 8 If φ1 = ···= φn =1 /n then the maximum speed of convergence to





and it is attained if and only if α1 = ···= αn = 2
δ+2.
5 Implications of ﬁrms’ number and composition
on the probability of stability
In the kind of markets we have in mind, heterogeneity has to do with the number of
diﬀerent types of ﬁrms operating in the market; in turn diﬀerent ﬁrms are charac-
terised by a diﬀerent behavioural degree of instability, βi. Therefore the number of
ﬁrms in the market is a rough measure of heterogeneity. If the level of heterogeneity
and/or the ﬁrms’ composition in the market changes as a result of policies or exoge-
nous structural breaks, what kind of consequences are to be expected on the system’s
stability? Knowing little (or nothing) about the nature of the process, we can make
inferences on the behavioural characteristic of the ﬁrms entering the market under
reasonable assumptions on the distribution of characters in the whole population.
Consider, for example, a market with a representative ﬁrm. Suppose that its
behavioural parameter β is unknown and that it can be considered as the realization
of a random variable uniformly distributed on the unit interval, U (0,1). Stability is
warranted in this case if δβ < 1 (see (3)), so the probability of such event, for a given
structural degree of instability δ>1,w i l lb e
R 1/δ
0 dx = 1
δ. One may wonder how this
probability will be aﬀected if n>1 or more in general if n varies. We shall deﬁne a
stable sample of behavioural parameters as one entailing the corresponding system
(2) has a locally stable steady state (p∗), which means, thanks to the characterisation
provided by Proposition 2, that δ¯ βn < 1. We look for the probability of drawing
as t a b l es a m p l ea saf u n c t i o no fδ,f o rag i v e nn. Assuming that the βi are drawn
independently from U (0,1) the expected value of ¯ βn is 1/2. This means the value
δ =2makes the expected value of δ¯ βn equal 1. But because the distribution of ¯ βn is
symmetric the probability of a stable sample when δ =2is exactly 1/2.N o t i c et h a t
in this case using the known form of the density for ¯ βn, fn (x),w ec a nw r i t ed o w n
the explicit probability functions for any n, mapping values of δ with the probability





11so we can write the probability functions explicitly6. These functions are obviously
decreasing in δ. Figure 2 depicts such functions for various n. N o t i c et h a th e t e r o -
geneity appears to have a stabilising/destabilising impact depending on whether δ is
less/more than a critical value (2 in this case). Some sort of polarization eﬀect seems
to be at work. Indeed we show that both these observations generalise easily be-
yond this example based on the uniform distribution. First, because of the stability
condition δ¯ βn < 1, the probability of a stable n-sample is the probability of having
¯ βn < 1/δ, which decreases with δ irrespective of the population distribution. Sec-
ond, we show that polarization is robust, using an argument based on what happens
taking the limit for n →∞in a fairly general setting.
Proposition 9 Let fn (x) the density for ¯ βn as the result of sampling the βi from
some distribution over the unit interval with E
¡¯ βn
¢
= ¯ β,a n dPn (δ) the probability
of a stable sample. As n →∞ , Pn (δ) converges pointwise to
P∞(δ)=
½
1 if 1 <δ<1/¯ β
0 if δ ≥ 1/¯ β
The above proposition entails that increasing n has the eﬀect of making stability
or instability (depending on δ) more and more likely. Figure 2 witnesses this fact
quite clearly.
Figure 2: Probability of a stable sample of betas.





2(n−1)! . So, for example, for n =2 ,3,4
we have P2 (δ)=
½
−2+4δ−δ2
δ2 if 1 <δ≤ 2
2






2δ3 if 1 <δ≤ 3/2
−18+27δ−9δ2+δ3
2δ3 if 3/2 <δ≤ 3
9




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
−32+128δ−192δ2+128δ3−29δ4
3δ4 if 1 <δ≤ 4/3
192−512δ+480δ2−176δ3+23δ4





6δ4 if 2 <δ≤ 4
32
3δ4 if δ > 4
12Another example, useful to illustrate the polarization eﬀect, is as follows: imagine


















2−αidαi =l n 4− 1 ' 0.39 which shows
that sampling these behavioural parameters instead of the instability degrees returns
a distribution for ¯ βn more geared towards low values. In principle it would be possible
to work out the distribution for ¯ βn,j u s ta sa b o v e :s i n c ei td o e sn o ta d dm u c hi n s i g h t
(while the algebra is more tedious), we just provide a (numerically obtained) picture
similar to the ﬁrst example, in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Probability of a stable sample of alphas.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We have analysed the dynamic consequences of expectations heterogeneity in a fairly
general cobweb model with n ﬁrms, each resorting to adaptive expectations with
a speciﬁc gain parameter. The concepts of structural and behavioural degree of
instability were introduced to distinguish the diﬀerent possible sources of failures to
converge to the unique steady state in the model. In particular the behavioural degree
of instability depends exclusively on the sensitivity of ﬁrms’ expectations. Stability is
shown to obtain if and only if the product of the two sources of instability is less than
o n e . W i t h i nt h em o d e l ,w eh a v ec l a r i ﬁed how marketwise outcomes are grounded
in individual ﬁrms’ characteristics and how a representative agent assumption can
inaccurately predict a stable outcome when the whole heterogeneous picture implies
otherwise. Conditions that make stability robust to market aggregation are provided
and the speed of convergence to the steady state for stable conﬁgurations has been
investigated. Finally we have studied a simple model of random selection of ﬁrms
that takes into account the diﬃculty of observing individual expectations reliably and
directly; our setup allows us to calculate the probability of a stable outcome, given
the number of ﬁrms and the structural degree of instability. A form of polarization
is documented, by which when the number of ﬁrms is large, stability most likely
13obtains for levels of the structural degree of instability up to a certain threshold,
while instability is almost certain past the threshold.
7 Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .
i) Consider ﬁrst the simpler case in which c1 = ···= cn =1 . Observe that





a1 + b1 −b1 ··· −b1
a2 b2 ··· 0
. . .
. . . ... . . .




where N is obtained from M subtracting its ﬁrst column from the remaining columns.
The equality of the two determinants stems from multilinearity in columns. Devel-
oping the determinant of N along the ﬁrst column clearly shows that it is linear in
each ai. As a consequence, expressing detM as sum of products along permutations
of the column indices, the only terms that do not cancel out are contained in the
product of terms along the diagonal (any other permutation contains products of the
type aiaj,i6= j. Eliminating terms that involve such products between diﬀerent ai’s





a1 a1 ··· a1
a2 a2 ··· a2
. . .
. . . ... . . .








b1 0 ··· 0
0 b2 ··· 0
. . .









c1 0 ··· 0
0 c2 ··· 0
. . .





For values of the ci 6=1the same results applies remarking that








































Suppose that b1 >b 2 > ···>b n.T h e n
n even ⇒ P (b1) > 0,P(b2) < 0,...,P(bn) < 0 (9)
n odd ⇒ P (b1) < 0,P(b2) > 0,...,P(bn) < 0
Therefore P (λ) has n−1 real roots and hence n real roots. Suppose more in general




b1,...,b 1 | {z }
n1 times
,b 2,...,b 2 | {z }
n2 times







j=1 nj = n. Let also k1 = {1,...,n 1},k 2 = {n1 +1 ,...,n 1 + n2},...,k m = nPm−1
j=1 nj +1 ,...,n
o
and ¯ ai =
P





























≡ P1 (λ)P2 (λ)
where, counting multiplicity, P1 (λ) has n−m real roots and P2 (λ) has m real roots
(this stems from what we showed for the case of distinct bis).
iii) and iv) From (10) we have that n−m eigenvalues take values in {bi}i=1,...,n.A l s o ,
from (9), it follows that m − 1 eigenvalues belong to (bn,b 1). Finally, as P (bn) < 0
and limλ→−∞ P (λ)=+ ∞, the remaining root of P (λ) must be smaller than bn and
t h e r e f o r ei ti sg r e a t e rt h a n−1 if and only if P (−1) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. Recalling that Jacobian (4) is a particular speciﬁcation
of matrix (5) with ai = −αi,b i =1− αi,c i = φiδ,L e m m a1p a r tiv) states that
local stability is equivalent to having the characteristic polynomial positive when




























1 − δ¯ βn
¢
which is positive if and only if δ¯ βn < 1.



















for the homogeneous market
Observe that the function f (x)= x












which gives the desired result.





















(1 − αj − λ) − φiδ
Y
j6=i






(1 − αj − λ)
Recall that, given Lemma 1 iii), for all i, λmin < 1 − αi while λmax ≤ 1 − αmin.






(1 − αj − λ)










(1 − αj − λ)










(1 − αj − λ)










(1 − αj − λ
= −
P (λ)










(1 − αj − λ)
So evaluating the derivative at λmin,w eh a v e
∂P (λ)
∂αi











(1 − αj − λmin) < 0
as P (λmin)=0and, due to part iii) of Lemma 1, (1 − αj − λmin) > 0 for all j.
Finally, because limλ→−∞ P (λ)=+ ∞ t h er e s u l tf o l l o w sf r o mt h ei n t e r m e d i a t ev a l u e
theorem. Besides, at λmax,w eh a v e
∂P (λ)
∂αi











(1 − αj − λmax)
> 0 if n is even
< 0 if n is odd
d u et oL e m m a1i i i )a n dλmax 6=1− αi. Again, because limλ→+∞ P (λ)=( −1)
n ∞
the result follows from the intermediate value theorem. It remains to consider the
case λmax =1− αmin.I fαi 6= αmin then trivially
∂P (λ)
∂αi
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
λ=λmax
=0
Otherwise if αi = αmin the result directly follows from part iii) of Lemma 1.










ΘA;a l s o
p∗
A <p ∗ <p ∗




























































































The proof under the alternative assumptions in (7) is identical.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 . F o l l o w i n gt h es a m ea r g u m e n ti nt h ep r o o fo fp a r ti v )o f
Lemma 1, λmin is greater than 0 if and only if the characteristic polynomial, P (λ),






























Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose for example that λmax > −λmin. Then, using
Lemma 4, for a small enough increase of a suitably chosen αi both λmax and λmin
decrease so that the speed of convergence actually rises. The case λmax < −λmin is
analogous.
Proof of Proposition 8. Consider ﬁrst a homogeneous conﬁguration α1 = ···= αn = α:
in such case
P (λ)=( 1 − α − λ)
n − αδ(1 − α − λ)
n−1
=( 1 − α − λ)
n−1 (1 − α − λ − αδ)=0
⇒ λmax =1− α, λmin =1− α − αδ
Due to Proposition 7, optimality requires λmax = −λmin which implies 1 − α =
−1+α+αδ,t h a ti sα = 2
δ+2 and λmax = −λmin = δ
δ+2. Consider now a non-constant
conﬁguration for the αi: surely it cannot be the speed of convergence maximizer
if αi ≤ 2
δ+2 (αi ≥ 2
δ+2) for all i, since in that case, due to Lemma 4, it would be
λmax > δ
δ+2 (λmin < − δ
δ+2). Also, there cannot be αi ≤ αj < 2
δ+2 or αi <α j ≤ 2
δ+2
for otherwise λmax > δ
δ+2, as a consequence of Lemma 1. So the only admissible
conﬁguration of non-constant αi has the form α1 < 2
δ+2 <α 2 ≤ ··· ≤ αn.F i r s t
17consider the case of only two diﬀerent values of α, α1 < 2
δ+2 <α 2 = ···= αn.I n
this case the characteristic polynomial is





(1 − α1 − λ)(1− α2 − λ) −
δ
n
α1 (1 − α2 − λ) −
n − 1
n
δα2 (1 − α1 − λ)
¶



















corresponding to a two-ﬁrms market with shares equal to 1
n and n−1
n . Due to the
particular ordering of the αi,t h et w or o o t so fP2 (λ) are λmin and λmax for Pn (λ).
To minimize the spectral radius, it is necessary that λmax = −λmin (see Proposition
7) and hence the trace of the matrix in (11) must be equal to 0. So the problem (in






































0 ≤ α1 ≤ 2
δ+2 ≤ α2 ≤ 1
whose solution is α1 = α2 = 2
δ+2.W e ﬁnally show that a conﬁguration with three
or more diﬀerent values for the αi cannot be optimal. Indeed let α1 <α 2 <α 3 and



















(1 − αj − λ)
it is
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂λmin
∂α1
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ <
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂λmin
∂α2
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ <
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂λmin
∂α3
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ (12)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂λmax
∂α2
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ >
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
∂λmax
∂α3
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ (13)
From Proposition 4 we know that increasing (decreasing) an αi reduces (increases)
both λmin and λmax:t h e r e f o r eas u ﬃciently small increase in α2 a n da ne q u a ld e c r e a s e
in α3 will increase the speed of convergence.
Proof of Proposition 9. The strong law of large numbers shows that Pr
¡





limn→∞ δ¯ βn = δ¯ β
¢
=1and therefore, for any δ>1, Pr
¡
limn→∞ δ¯ βn < 1
¢
= ½
1 if 1 <δ<1/¯ β
0 if δ ≥ 1/¯ β .
18References
[1] Branch, W. (2004). The Theory of Rationally Heterogeneous Expectations: Ev-
idence from Survey Data on Inﬂation Expectations. The Economic Journal, 114,
592—621.
[2] Branch, W. & Evans G. W. (2006). Intrinsic heterogeneity in expectation for-
mation. Journal of Economic Theory, 127, 264-295.
[3] Brock, W. & Hommes, C. (1997). A Rational Route to Randomness. Economet-
rica, 65, 1059-1095.
[4] Buraschi, A. & Jiltsov, A. (2007). Model Uncertainty and Option Markets with
Heterogeneous Beliefs. Journal of Finance, 61(6), 2841-2897.
[5] Carlson, J.A. (1968). An Invariably Stable Cobweb Model. Review of Economic
Studies 35(3), 360-362
[6] Carroll, C.D. (2003). Macroeconomic Expectations of Households and Profes-
sional Forecasters. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 269-298.
[7] Chavas, J.P. (2000). On information and market dynamics: the case of the U.S.
beef market. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 24, 833-853.
[8] Chiarella, C., He, X.-Z., Hung, H. & Zhu P. (2006). An analysis of the cobweb
model with boundedly rational heterogeneous producers. Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization 61(4), 750-768.
[9] Evans G. W. & Honkapohja, S. (2001). Learning and expectations in macroeco-
nomics. Princeton University Press.
[10] Evans G. W. & Guesnerie R. (2005). Coordination on saddle-path solutions: the
eductive viewpoint - linear multivariate models. Journal of Economic Theory,
124, 202-229.
[11] Franke, R. & Nesemann, T. (1999). Two destabilizing strategies may be jointly
stabilizing. Journal of Economics, 69(1), 1-18.
[12] Frankel, J.A. & Froot, K.A. (1990). The Rationality of the Foreign Exchange
Rate. Chartists, Fundamentalists and Trading in the Foreign Exchange Market,
American Economic Review 80(2), AEA Papers and Proceedings, 181-185.
[13] Hardy, G., Littlewood, J. E. & Pòlya, G (1988). Inequalities. Second Edition.
Cambridge University Press.
[14] Herrendorf, B., Valentinyi, A., & Waldmann, R. (2000). Ruling out multiplicity
and indeterminacy: the role of heterogeneity. Review of Economic Studies, 67,
295-307.
19[15] Honkapohja, S. & Mitra, K. (2005). Performance of monetary policy with inter-
nal central bank forecasting. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 29,
627—658.
[16] Hommes, C. (2005). Heterogeneous agent models in economic and ﬁnance. Hand-
book of computational Economics, Volume 2: Agent-based computational eco-
nomics, Edited by Judd, K.L. & Tesfatsion, T., Elsevier Science B.V.
[17] Jouini, E. & Napp, C. (2007). Consensus Consumer and Intertemporal Asset
Pricing with Heterogeneous Beliefs. Review of Economic Studies, 74(4), 1149-
1174.
[18] Mankiw, N., Reis, R. & Wolfers, J. (2004). Disagreement about Inﬂation Expec-
tations. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2003, Edited by Gertler, M. & Rogoﬀ,
K, MIT Press.
[19] Manzan, S. & Westerhoﬀ, F.H. (2007). Heterogeneous expectations, exchange
rate dynamics and predictability. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
64(1), 111-128.
[20] Negroni, G. (2003). Adaptive expectations coordination in an economy with
heterogeneous agents. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 28, 117-140.
[21] Nerlove M. (1958). Adaptive expectations and cobweb phenomena. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 72(2), 227-240.
[22] Puu, T. (2008). On the stability of Cournot equilibrium when the number of
competitors increases. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 66, 445-
456.
20